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This paper examines the long-run e¤ects of supply shocks (such as oil
shocks) on in‡ation in the United States. The persistence of supply shocks
in U.S. in‡ation fell considerably during the period of Volcker’s disin‡ation
(1979-1982). My empirical results suggest that the di¤erence between the
pre-Volcker and post-Volcker periods is attributable to the change in the
behavior of in‡ation expectations - agents expected shocks to persist in
the pre-Volcker period, but not in the post-Volcker period. I construct a
simple model of how di¤erent monetary policies lead to di¤erent persistence
equilibria.
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There has been much debate about how “supply” shocks e¤ect in‡ation. Most
economists would agree that shocks, such as sudden large changes in the prices
of food and oil, in‡uence in‡ation over the short run: the studies of Ball and
Mankiw (1995) and Gordon (1998) show that such shocks explain a large fraction
of variability in post-war U.S. in‡ation. However, there is no consensus about
the e¤ects of supply shocks on in‡ation over the long run. The conventional
wisdom about the persistence of supply shocks has been determined in large
part by the experience of the Great In‡ation of the 1970s. One explanation
often given concerning this as well as other periods of in‡ation instability is
that, under an accommodative policy, shocks feed into in‡ation expectations.
In‡ation remains high until the FED tightens policy and drives the economy
into a recession (Ball, 1991). The other view holds the complete opposite; that
supply shocks merely cause short-run ‡uctuations in in‡ation (Blinder, 1982).
Knowing whether shocks have permanent or transitory e¤ects and what
determines the magnitude of the e¤ects is important in formulating monetary
policy. Given the variability in commodity prices, policymakers often face a
dilemma as to how to react to shocks. Should they accommodate them over the
short run and wait until in‡ation returns to its initial level? Or do they need to
drive economy into a recession to o¤set the shocks? Another related question
is whether favorable shocks can permanently reduce the in‡ation rate.
Section 2 examines whether supply shocks have permanent or temporary
e¤ects on in‡ation. As an in‡ation model, I use the Phillips curve augmented
1with various measures of shocks. I …nd that the persistence of shocks is very
di¤erent in two subsamples. In the period before Volcker’s disin‡ation (1960-
1979), the shocks had a long-run e¤ect on in‡ation. The size of the permanent
component was roughly 50% of the initial impact. On the other hand, in the
period after Volcker’s disin‡ation (1983-2000), the persistence of shocks in the
in‡ation rate was negligible. In this period, supply shocks to in‡ation die out
in less than half a year.
In Section 3, I explore the reasons for the di¤erence. I argue that the persis-
tence of shocks is closely linked to the behavior of expectations. When agents
believe that the e¤ects will be permanent, shocks feed into their expectations,
and the persistence of shocks is thus large. On the other hand, when agents
believe that the e¤ects of shocks are only temporary, in‡ation quickly returns
to its initial level. I estimate a model of expectations where agents take into
account information on past in‡ation and past shocks. Based on the data from
the two surveys of in‡ation expectations, I …nd that agents expected shocks to
persist during the pre-Volcker period but not during the post-Volcker period.
Moreover, the degree of persistence in expected in‡ation is very similar to the
degree of persistence in the actual in‡ation rate for both periods.
In Section 4, I then give a simple theoretical interpretation of the stylized
facts. I show how the accommodative policy of the sixties and seventies gave
rise to the persistence of shocks in expected in‡ation, and therefore in actual
in‡ation. In contrast, the activist policy of the eighties and nineties eliminated
the persistence of shocks.
2In Section 5, I conclude by returning to the continuing debate about the
run-up of in‡ation in the 1970s. I assert that the persistence of shocks during
the pre-Volcker period was too short-lived to explain the run-up of in‡ation in
the seventies. Shocks explain only 30% of the increase in in‡ation during the
two relevant episodes. Interpretations of the Great In‡ation of the 1970s based
on various excess demand stories (e.g., Clarida, Gali, Gertler, 2000, and De
Long, 1997) appear quantitatively more important.
2 Persistence of supply shocks
2.1 In‡ation model
As a statistical model of in‡ation, I use a standard version of the Phillips
curve:
!! = " + #($)!!¡1 + %($)(&!¡1 ¡ &¤
!¡1)+’0()*"+! + ’($)()*"+!¡1 + ,!- (1)
where !! is the in‡ation rate, &! the unemployment rate, and &¤
! am e a s u r eo f
unemployment trend. ()*"+! is a variable summarizing the in‡ationary impact
of supply shocks (de…ned below), and .! is an unidenti…ed in‡ation shock with
standard statistical properties.
To examine the persistence of supply shocks, I compute the long-run impact
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This is clearly the most practical de…nition of persistence. The value of /
3tells us to what extent in‡ation would fall back to its original level after a bad
shock if the economy were kept at its potential output. I use two criteria to
assess the persistence of shocks. I test whether the long-run e¤ect of shocks
on in‡ation (/) is statistically signi…cant. To provide a quantitative measure of
persistence, I also compute the ratio of long-run and contemporaneous responses
of in‡ation with respect to the shock:1 #
$0.
2.2 Measures of shocks
Researchers have traditionally used the prices of food and energy to measure
“supply” or “price” shocks. A large price increase in one sector is in‡ationary
because prices in other sectors do not immediately adjust in the opposite direc-
tion to o¤set the shock. Historically, prices in the food and energy sectors have
been extremely volatile and therefore, relative changes of price in the food and
energy sectors explain a large fraction of in‡ation variability. I use this index
as one measure of supply shocks.
Ball and Mankiw (1995) developed alternative measures of supply shocks,
which take into account the fact that a large price change can occur in any
sector. Based on their insights and on the work of Bryan and Cecchetti (1994),
I use the “median gap” as my second measure of supply shocks. The median
gap is de…ned as the di¤erence between the in‡ation rate and the weighted-
median (core) in‡ation rate. The reason for using this measure is that core
in‡ation is not immediately e¤ected by sector-speci…c price changes. Therefore,
1T a k i n gar a t i oo ft h el o n g - r u nr e s p o n s eo v e rt h ec o n t e m p o r a n e o u sr e s p o n s ei ss e n s i b l ei n
an environment where the contemporaneous impact of a shock is larger than the impact in all
other periods. Since I work with quarter-to-quarter in‡ation without any time averaging, the
estimated impulse responses have this property.
4the median gap extracts the in‡ationary e¤ect of price shocks from all sectors
of the economy. This feature is particularly important for the interpretation
of recent episodes, where sectors such as technology, health care and tobacco
contributed to in‡ation volatility.2
In practice, the median gap is highly correlated with traditional measures of
shocks (correlation with food and energy shocks is 72%) and therefore results
for both measures are similar. Nevertheless, using the median gap as a more
general proxy for supply shocks is desirable, as it is based on explicit theory.
Moreover, it explains a larger fraction of in‡ation changes than food and energy
variables alone.
2.3 Estimated Phillips curves
I estimate the Phillips curve (1) using U.S. quarterly data from 1960:1 to
2000:3 (food and energy shocks) and 1968:1-2000:3 (median gap).3 As a measure
of in‡ation, I use the annualized quarter-to-quarter percentage change in the
CPI-U price index.4 Here, &! is the seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment
rate, and &¤
! is a measure of the unemployment trend, estimated using the HP
…lter with a smoothness coe¢cient of 2=1,600. The supply shock “()*"+!”
is approximated using the median gap, de…ned as the quarterly CPI in‡ation
2Ball and Mankiw develop a number of supply shock measures, particularly measures
based on the skewness of the distribution of relative price changes. With respect to empirical
implementation, I prefer the median gap over the skewness measures as the median gap can
easily be computed from data available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
3Equations with the median gap are estimated over the shorter sample due to limited
availability of median in‡ation data.
4I do not use CPI-U-X1 or CPI-U-RS series as in the next section I will work with measures
of survey expectations. The in‡ation expectation is, of course, formed with respect to in‡ation
as de…ned at the time of the expectations survey. Moreover, the median in‡ation series is
computed using the historical CPI basket weights.
5minus the quarterly change in the weighted median CPI index. Alternatively,
the ()*"+! is measured using the food and energy index, de…ned as the di¤erence
between the quarterly CPI in‡ation and the in‡ation rate ex food and energy.
Both measures of shocks are very close to constituting a white noise. I use four
lags of all the variables, based on the AIC and BIC criteria.
Historical accounts of post-war in‡ation in the U.S. (De Long, 1997, and
Taylor, 1997) have emphasized that the character of monetary policy changed
considerably at the end of the 1970s. It would be natural if changes in the
dynamics of in‡ation corresponded with the regime break as well. Therefore, I
test for a structural change in the estimated parameters at an unknown point
in time using the Andrews-Ploberger test (Andrews, Ploberger, 1994, and An-
drews, Lee, Ploberger, 1996). The null of coe¢cient stability can be rejected at
a one-percent level in all versions of the Phillips curve. For the version of the
Phillips curve with the median gap, the lowest p-value of the F-statistics occurs
at 1980:3 (0.004). Another local minimum is found at 1981:4. There are also
a number of p-values of less than 0.05 around these two dates. The statistical
evidence, therefore, is consistent with the idea that the change in the conduct
of monetary policy contributed to a change in the dynamics of in‡ation.
I de…ne the subsamples for the analysis of persistence as the following peri-
ods: 1960:1 - 1979:4, and 1983:1-2000:3. I do not include the transitional period
1980:1-1982:4 in the analysis. Certain variants of the tests indicate that there
may have been another structural break in equation (1) in 1974. This date
coincides with the end of Nixon’s price controls, and a temporary tightening
6of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. I will nevertheless assume that the
pre-Volcker period is, to a …rst-order approximation, a stable one.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize basic regression results. Figure 1 illustrates the
quality of …t achieved by equation (1), both in terms of the level of in‡ation
and its changes. The adjusted 32 of the regressions is between 80 and 90%.
Depending on the subsample, supply shocks contribute 20-50% to the in-sample
…t of the equations. In line with traditional Phillips curve research, I assume
that in‡ation contains a unit root. I thus restrict the sum of coe¢cients on past
in‡ation such that it equals one. As a robustness check, I estimate the Phillips
curve with unrestricted coe¢cients. It turns out that the estimated coe¢cients
change very little. The reason is that the sum of the coe¢cients on lagged
in‡ation is close to one in both subsamples: 0.88 (0.09) or 0.96 (0.05) for the
pre-Volcker period and 0.84 (0.09) or 0.92 (0.09) for the post-Volcker period.
2.4 The persistence of supply shocks before and after Volcker’s
disin‡ation
Before turning to an analysis of the impulse response functions generated
by estimated equation (1), it is interesting to note the sharp change in the sum
of the coe¢cients on supply shocks between the two subsamples. For the pre-
Volcker period, the sum is positive (0.466) and signi…cant (with a standard error
of 0.214). It is a substantial fraction (approximately 2/3) of the initial impact
of shock on in‡ation. On the other hand, for the post-Volcker period, the sum
is very close to zero (-0.036) and insigni…cant (with a standard error of 0.093).
The persistence of supply shocks apparently changed during the period of
7Volcker’s disin‡ation and the impulse responses drawn in Figures 2a and 2b
con…rm this conjecture.5 For the pre-Volcker era, the long-run response of
in‡ation to shocks is approximately 50% of the initial impact. The persistence
index, de…ned as the long-run over contemporaneous response ( #
$0), is 51.3%
for median gap (with a standard error of 16%) and 56.5% for food and energy
(with a standard error of 7%). Moreover, it takes four to …ve quarters for the
in‡ation rate to get close to a steady state.
For the post-disin‡ation sample, the relative price shocks have very little per-
sistence, both in statistical and economic terms. The persistence index is 1.8%
f o rm e d i a ng a pa n d4 . 6 %f o rf o o da n de n e r g y .T h em e d i a ng a ps h o c ka l r e a d y
dies out after 1 quarter. The e¤ect of the food and energy shock disappears at
a l m o s tt h es a m er a t e . 6
Figure 3 demonstrates the robustness of these conclusions using an alterna-
tive method. I estimate the persistence index #
$0 in rolling samples over a period
of 15 years. The …gure clearly illustrates how the persistence of supply shocks
dropped after the pre-Volcker data fell out of the regressions. The analysis of
persistence is also robust with respect to assumptions about the number of lags
and HP …lter parameter 2.
5The impulse responses are calculated from equation (1) assuming unemployment is at its
natural level and in‡ation contains a unit root.
6Hooker (2002) reaches a similar conclusion about the persistence of supply shocks using
a di¤erent methodology. He …nds that oil shocks do not pass through into core in‡ation after
1981, but do so prior. Hooker also demonstrates that a model with a structural break in
the e¤ects of shocks provides a better …t for the data than models based on asymmetries or
nonlinearities.
83 Supply shocks and in‡ation expectations
3.1 Expectation hypothesis
When prices are sticky, in‡ation expectations are the main force driving
in‡ation dynamics. The central feature of in‡ation dynamics - in‡ation inertia
- is often attributed to the strong backward-looking component in expected
in‡ation (Ball, 2000), or to the slow propagation of information (Mankiw and
Reis, 2002). In this section, I examine whether another important feature of
in‡ation dynamics - the persistence or non-persistence of supply shocks - can
also be clearly linked to the behavior of expectations.
The textbook version of a Phillips curve incorporating expectations and
supply shocks is:
!! =!¡1 !%
! + %($)(&!¡1 ¡ &¤
!¡1)+’&
0()*"+! + ,!- (2)
where !¡1!%
! is the time 4 ¡ 1 aggregate expectation of time 4 in‡ation. In
this equation, actual in‡ation depends on expected in‡ation, the unemployment
gap, and on shocks not known at time 4 ¡ 1.
The simplest theory of expectation formation capturing in‡ation stickiness
is the one assuming adaptive expectations:
!¡1!%
! = "& + #&($)!!¡11
However, this theory fails to explain, among other things, why supply shocks
have permanent e¤ects on in‡ation in one regime, and only temporary e¤ects
in another. Based on the empirical results in Section 2, a better reduced-form
9description of expectation formation seems to be:
!¡1!%
! = "& + #&($)!!¡1 + ’&($)()*"+!¡1 + 5!¡11 (3)
Equation (3) assumes that agents distinguish between di¤erent sources of in-
‡ation changes, and that di¤erent shocks can have di¤erent e¤ects on expected
in‡ation. In particular, supply shocks can have either permanent or temporary
e¤ects depending on the magnitude of coe¢cients ’.I f’’s are zero (or moder-
ately negative) and the sum of #’s is one, then supply shocks can be expected
to have permanent e¤ects. On the other hand, if ’’s are large and negative,
shocks are more or less expected to die out. Therefore, speci…cation (3) makes
allowance for supply shocks to have di¤erent degrees of persistence under dif-
ferent monetary regimes. The term 5! captures information other than past
in‡ation and shocks, which agents conceivably might take into account when
formulating their in‡ation forecast. The implicit assumption in the regression
analysis below is that 5!¡1 is orthogonal with respect to other right-hand vari-
ables in (3).
The above equation for in‡ation expectations should not be interpreted as
an attempt to formulate the true mechanism of expectation formation. This
reduced form will only be used to illustrate the changing beliefs of agents con-
cerning the e¤ects of supply shocks, and to show how, following supply shocks,
expectations behavior in‡uences actual in‡ation dynamics.
After substituting equation (3) into equation (2), we obtain a Phillips curve
10with the same functional form as the Phillips curve estimated in Section 2:
!! = "& +#&($)!!¡1+%($)(&!¡1¡&¤
!¡1)+’&
0()*"+!+’&($)()*"+!¡1+e ,!1 (4)
The idea that the persistence of shocks is related to the expectations of
agents is testable using data from in‡ation expectations surveys. In this respect,
equation (3) has two speci…c implications. First, one can test whether agents
at all take into account information about supply shocks when they form their
expectations. At the same time, one can examine whether agents put “correct”
weights on past in‡ation and shocks; i.e. one can test whether #($)=#&($)-
’($)=’&($)- and " = "&.
Secondly, equation (3) asserts that the persistence of supply shocks in actual
in‡ation is determined by the beliefs of agents. If this is correct, then lags
of shocks should only enter the Phillips curve through the expected in‡ation
term. To test this prediction, I estimate Phillips curves adding a measure of
expected in‡ation to the right hand side. After controlling for expectations, the
coe¢cients on past shocks (’&&’s) should be zero:
!! =!¡1 !%
! + %($)(&!¡1 ¡ &¤
!¡1)+’&
0()*"+! + ’&&($)()*"+!¡1 + ,!1 (5)
In addition, the coe¢cients on contemporaneous ()*"+! should be the same
as the coe¢cients on ()*"+! in Phillips curve (1); ’0 = ’&
01
As a measure of expected in‡ation, I use in‡ation forecasts from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters and the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.7
7Other sources of in‡ation forecasts, most notably the Livingston survey and the OECD
forecasts, are reported only semi-annually, and are not suitable for my analysis, which is based
on quarterly data.
11Since the SPF and Michigan surveys collect data about qualitatively di¤erent
in‡ation rates, I carry out the analysis of expectations in two separate sections,
3.2 and 3.3. It will be interesting to verify whether supply shocks in‡uence the
average in‡ation forecasts of professional economists and households similarly.
3.2 The Survey of Professional Forecasters
The Survey of Professional Forecasters collects forecasts from private-sector
economists who predict future developments in the economy as their normal
course of business. The Survey is currently run by the Philadelphia Federal
Reserve Bank, and the typical number of respondents per survey varies between
20 and 40. I use data on one-quarter-ahead CPI in‡ation forecasts, the database
for which dates back to 1981. In the optimal case, we would like to recover !¡1!%
!
from the expectations data. The survey participants, however, have only partial
information about the 4¡1 state of the economy when submitting their forecasts
for time 4 in‡ation. For example, forecasts for the third quarter are reported
to the Philadelphia FED already at the end of May. If a shock should occur in
July, the respondents would not have that information available. Therefore, the
coe¢cients on the regressors dated 4 ¡ 1 in equation (3) should be interpreted
with caution: respondent cannot react to information they do not have. Fortu-
nately, tests of expectation formation can still be carried out on the regressors
dated 4 ¡ 2 and earlier.
( i )T e s t1
In this subsection, I explore whether the predictions of professional economists
12concerning in‡ation are consistent with equation (3). I regress expected in‡a-
tion on four lags of past in‡ation and shocks (the baseline number of lags from
the previous section). As a measure of shocks, I use the median gap.8 The
sample period is 1983:1-2000:3.
Since supply shocks quickly die out from the actual in‡ation for this period,
one would expect shocks to enter equation (3) with large negative coe¢cients.
Table 4 con…rms that this conjecture indeed holds true in the data. All coe¢-
cients are negative, most of them signi…cantly.9
Moreover, the magnitude of the coe¢cients on in‡ation lags and supply
shocks is comparable to those obtained from the Phillips curve (1). A quick
informal comparison of the relevant coe¢cients is provided in Table 4. The
similarity between the two sets of coe¢cients is striking. For example, the
coe¢cients on shocks 4 ¡ 2, 4 ¡ 3 and 4 ¡ 4 in equation (3) are -0.26, -0.14 and
-0.12, while those in the Phillips curve are -0.28, -0.15 and -0.17 respectively.
Statistically, the p-value of the F-test checking whether the coe¢cients on
lagged shocks are the same in equations (1) and (3) is 0.75 or 0.35, depending
on the assumption about the stationarity of in‡ation. The F-test of whether
the in‡ation lags are the same, #($)=#&($), has a p-value of 0.24 or 0.16.
The joint F-test of #($)=#&($)-’ ($)=’&($) and " = "& (where applicable)
has a p-value of 0.11 or 0.05 (again, depending on the assumption about the
8Regressions using the food and energy variable produce results qualitatively consistent
with expectation equation (3), although the tight quantitative restrictions imposed by equa-
tions (2) and (3) are rejected more often than is the case with regressions using the median
gap.
9Moreover, !"#$%! should not enter equation (3) signi…cantly. This holds true as well. I
do not report the relevant regression results for the sake of brevity.
13stationarity of in‡ation). All tests exclude 4 ¡ 1 variables. The slight rejection
in one of the speci…cations should not be overstated as the coe¢cients are very
close to one other in economic terms. Also, I treat the Phillips curve coe¢cients
in #($) and ’($) as constants, making the tests conservative.
As expected, the coe¢cient on the 4 ¡ 1 shock in equation (3) is far away
from its Phillips curve counterpart in equation (1), and is biased towards zero.
This is natural as respondents do not have full 4¡1 information when they form
their SPF in‡ation forecast for period 4.
(ii) Test 2
Now I test another implication of expectation equation (3): that lags of
supply shocks only enter the Phillips curve (1) through the expected in‡ation
term. If this is the case, the coe¢cients on past shocks should be zero when
the Phillips curve is augmented with a measure of expectations, as in equation
(5). The …rst column of Table 6 reports the relevant coe¢cients. The results
are broadly consistent with the hypothesis.
T h ec o e ¢ c i e n t so nl a g so fs h o c k sf a l lt o w a r d sz e r o( ’2, ’3,a n d’4 are -0.11,
-0.01, and -0.06 respectively) and are insigni…cant as expected (the p-value of
the F-test that they are jointly equal to zero is 0.28). The t-statistic on the
…rst lag of ()*"+ is relatively high (1.7 in absolute value), but again, this is
attributable to the fact that respondents do not always have information about
the 4 ¡ 1 supply shock when they form their SPF in‡ation forecast. Note also
that the coe¢cient on contemporaneous shock (0.86) correctly remains close to
its counterpart from the Phillips curve (1): 0.83 (p-value of 0.72).
14In sum, the results from the Survey of Professional Forecasters strongly
support the hypothesis that during the post-Volcker period, agents have viewed
supply shocks as only a temporary phenomenon. Moreover, on average, their
belief apparently materializes.
3.3 The University of Michigan Survey of Consumers
Now I carry out both tests of the expectations hypothesis (equation (3)), us-
ing in‡ation forecasts from the University of Michigan Survey.10 The Michigan
data is available for the period before Volcker’s disin‡ation. I am, therefore,
able to compare behaviors of expectations for the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker
periods. The tests are not a mere repetition of the exercises done in sub-section
3.2, as the two surveys ask about di¤erent in‡ation rates. The SPF reports
quarter-to-quarter in‡ation forecasts one period ahead - !¡1( ’!
’!¡1 ¡ 1)% - while
the Michigan survey reports expectations of annual average in‡ation four quar-
ters ahead; that is, !¡4( ’!
’!¡4 ¡1)%. This fact requires a substantial modi…cation
of the tests.
First of all, I need a baseline equation for the dynamics of average in‡ation.
To avoid complications arising from the MA structure in residuals generated by
time averaging, I do not estimate the Phillips curve for average in‡ation, but
rather make use of the regressions results from Section 2. I de…ne four-quarter






!!¡+, and assume that !
()*
! ¼ ( ’!
’!¡4 ¡1).
10The (quarterly) University of Michigan study surveys a sample of 1500-2000 U.S. house-
holds. The households are selected based on demographic criteria such that the structure
of the sample matches the composition of the U.S. population. Among other questions, the
respondents are asked: “by what percent do you expect prices to go up, on average, during
t h en e x tt w e l v em o n t h s . ”





Coe¢cients 6, 7 and 2 are averages of the original Phillips curve parameters
#, %,a n d’ from equation (1). The relevant formulas are provided in Appendix
A.
Once I compute the coe¢cients of the Phillips curve for average in‡ation
(equation (6)), I will be able to test whether the weights on past in‡ation and
shocks in the Michigan expectations are consistent with weights in actual in‡a-
tion. Technically, the Michigan survey is carried out through the whole quarter,
and as with the SPF, respondents do not have all the necessary information
about 4 ¡ 4 variables to make forecasts of time 4 average in‡ation. The tests
therefore exclude regressors timed at 4 ¡ 4. In the next two subsections, I will
show how the restrictions imposed by the expectation hypothesis (3) apply when
working with average in‡ation and one-year ahead forecasts.
( i )T e s t1
Here I examine whether households take into account information about
supply shocks when forming their forecasts, and whether they put appropriate




! )% = 6
&($)!!¡4 + 2
&($)()*"+!¡4 + ,!1 (7)
I subsequently test whether the coe¢cients in 6
&($) and 2
&($) are close to
the coe¢cients implied by the Phillips curve (6). I denote these theoretical
16coe¢cients as 6
&&($) and 2
&&($). Formulas for them are provided in Appendix
A.11
Tables 5a and 5b summarize the regression results from equation (7). For
the post-Volcker period, the lags of shocks enter negatively. By contrast, for
the pre-Volcker period, the coe¢cients on lags of shocks are close to zero and
are insigni…cant. As explained above, this qualitative di¤erence is consistent
with what one would expect given the empirical pattern of persistence in actual
in‡ation.
The quantitative implications of the expectation hypothesis hold approxi-
mately as well. The coe¢cients 2
& on lags of shocks in the equation for ex-
pectations (7) are not far from the coe¢cients 2
&& derived from the Phillips
curve (see Tables 5a and 5b). Speci…cally, for the I(1) model of in‡ation, the 2
&
coe¢cients for t-5, t-6, and t-7 shocks for the pre-Volcker period are -0.07, 0.02,
and -0.03 respectively. The equivalent 2
&&’s are 0.03, 0.10, and 0.19. For the
post-Volcker period, the tested 2
&’s are -0.29, -0.24, and -0.09. The equivalent
2
&& coe¢cients are -0.27, -0.15, and -0.09.
For the pre-Volcker period, the null that coe¢cients on shocks in 2
&($) are
equal to those in 2
&&($) has a p-value of 0.35. The test on in‡ation coe¢cients,
6
&($)=6





&&($) has a p-value of 0.40 (all statistics apply to the I(1) model).
For the post-Volcker period, the same tests have p-values of 0.62, 0.11, and 0.27
11Polynomials &""(’) and (""(’) in equation (7) are di¤erent from &(’) and ((’) in equa-
tion (6) as at time ) ¡ 4,a g e n t sd on o tk n o w*!¡1, *!¡2, *!¡3, and must therefore forecast
these variables.
17respectively. Looking at the battery of tests for both I(1) and I(0) models of in-
‡ation, the expectation hypothesis is not, with one exception, rejected. Further,
the coe¢cient estimates of 6
&($) and 2
&($) are, in economic terms, remarkably
close to their theoretical values 6
&&($) and 2
&&($). Again, the tests are conser-
vative as the coe¢cients in 2
&& and 6
&& are treated as constants. Similarly, as
was the case with the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the coe¢cient on the
supply shock ()*"+!¡4, which occurs in the quarter during which expectations
are formed, is excluded from testing. It is biased towards zero as not all the
respondents know the value of the shock when they form their forecasts.
(ii) Test 2
The second test examines whether in‡ation expectations fully account for
the dynamic response of in‡ation to supply shocks. The intuition behind this
test is similar to that in the case of the Survey of Professional Forecasters. I





! )% + 7($)(&!¡1 ¡ &¤
!¡1)+20()*"+! + 2($)()*"+!¡1 + 8!1 (8)
Then, I test whether the coe¢cients on shocks, which occurred after the
expectations were taken, stay signi…cant and unchanged in size. The coe¢cients
on the shocks which occurred before the expectations were taken should become
insigni…cant.
During estimation, I include MA terms to control for serial correlation in 8!
generated by time averaging. The second and third columns of Table 6 report the
regression results. Qualitatively, predictions about the signi…cance of coe¢cients
18are met. The coe¢cients on shocks 4, 4¡1, 4¡2 and 4¡3 are jointly signi…cant
(with p-values of 0.04 or less), and often individually signi…cant. Quantitative
predictions about the values of coe¢cients on this group of supply shocks are
not rejected. The p-values of the F-tests are 0.56 for the pre-Volcker period and
0.13 for the post-Volcker period. Shocks which occured before expectations were
taken (4¡5, 4¡6, 4¡7) are, individually and jointly, statistically insigni…cant as
expected: the p-values of F-tests are 0.54 and 0.19. Finally, the joint predictions
of the expectations hypothesis about the values of coe¢cients (4, ..., 4¡3, 4¡5,
4¡6, 4¡7) are not rejected at the 0.73 level for the pre-Volcker period and are
only weakly rejected at the 0.05 level for the post-Volcker period.
4 Equilibrium persistence of shocks
4.1 A simple model of the economy
In the previous section, I demonstrated that the persistence of shocks is
closely related to, and possibly determined by, the behavior of in‡ation expec-
tation. But how are these expectations formed in the …rst place? The natu-
ral answer is that expectations are consistent with the anticipated actions of
policymakers. When agents expect policymakers to accommodate shocks, the
expected in‡ation is likely to rise after unfavorable shocks. On the other hand,
when policymakers move aggressively against supply shocks, agents expect the
shocks to die out. In this section, I describe how di¤erent policy regimes lead
to di¤erent persistence equilibria.
Consider a simple model where all …rms set prices every period. The rela-
19tionship between the output gap and in‡ation is summarized by an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve:
!! =!¡1 !%
! + %9! + .-
! - (9)
where .-
! is a "supply" shock; that is, a shock that increases in‡ation for any
given level of output.
I express the monetary policy objective using in‡ation target !¤ (this target
can be explicit or implicit). Policymakers are able to perfectly implement their






Further, I assume that …rms can forecast the systematic component of the pol-
icymakers’ target. I make this assumption because, as discussed below, my
analysis focuses on two types of stable policy regimes: accommodative and
anti-in‡ationary. I ignore the problem of transitions between regimes as well as
the important fact that expectations adjust slowly to changes in regime (Ball,
1991). Using this simple model, I study how the two di¤erent policies a¤ect the
persistence of in‡ation shocks.
4.2 An accommodative policy
Policymakers that are mainly concerned about the output e¤ects of their
policy actions and are insensitive to the level of in‡ation select their in‡ation
target such that expected output is zero: :9 =0 . Following from the Phillips




We may think of the target as an approximate description of the actual be-
havior of policymakers during the 1960s and 1970s. De Long (1997) and Romer
and Romer (1989) demonstrate that the primary objective of policymakers dur-
ing these decades was to keep output at or above its potential.12
The solution of the model for in‡ation is:
!! =!¡1 !%
! + %9! + .-
! 1 (11)
Ball (1991) and Christiano and Gust (2000) have argued that accommoda-
tive policies like those in equation (10) generate an in…nite number of in‡ation
equilibria. The reason is that policymakers are willing to set their target equal
to any in‡ation expectation; as such, the beliefs of agents become self-ful…lling.
Using the terminology of Christiano and Gust, accommodation creates an "ex-
pectations trap.” The same feature is also present in this model. Since the
expected values of the output gap and in‡ation shock are zero, in‡ation equals,
on average, its expectation. At the same time, any path for expectation !¡1!%
!
can be made consistent with the model.
The expectations trap theory makes no provision for predicting the persis-
tence of supply shocks. As an illustration, we may think of agents as forming
expectations based on the in‡ation trend, as well as their belief as to how much
12Of course, policymakers stopped accommodating when in‡ation became too high, specif-
ically in 1968 and in 1974 (Romer and Romer). In both cases, the turnaround in policy
was only temporary. For simplicity, I ignore these two policy shocks and assume that agents
thought of the accommodative policy as the typical regime.





The in‡ation trend, or core in‡ation, is here de…ned as the level of in‡ation
without in‡ation shock: !./0%
!¡1 = !!¡1¡.-
!¡1. It is apparent that any expectation
process (any set of parameters # and ’) can constitute an equilibrium:
!! = #!./0%
!¡1 + ’.-
!¡1 + %9! + .-
!
= #!!¡1 + %9! + .-
! +( ’ ¡ #).-
!¡11 (12)
Equation (12) suggests that an accommodative policy supports the equilib-
rium observed over the pre-Volcker period: in‡ation has unit root, while supply
shocks partly die out. The degree of pass-through into in‡ation of supply shocks
is regulated by the di¤erence between parameters ’ and #.
4.3 An aggressive policy
The indeterminacy of the in‡ation process disappears in the model as soon as
policymakers stop pursuing a fully accommodative policy. To build an analogy
with the previous example, we might postulate that policymakers set their in‡a-
tion target taking the core in‡ation rate as a benchmark, while accommodating





Firms understand this objective, therefore:
!¡1!%
! = !¤
! = #!!¡1 +( ’ ¡ #).-
!¡11 (15)
22The solution for in‡ation is the same as previously:
!! = #!!¡1 + %9! + .-
! +( ’ ¡ #).-
!¡11
However, the equilibirium for degree of persistence is now determined by
policymakers. Consider the special case where # =1and % =0 1 Here, core
in‡ation represents that part of the underlying movement of in‡ation, which
policymakers do not counteract. At the same time, policymakers move aggres-
sively against in‡ation shocks. In equilibrium, supply shocks die out from the
in‡ation rate autonomously. The reason is that both the core and expected
in‡ation rates are independent of .-. This special case qualitatively …ts the
stylized facts about the conduct of policy and the behavior of in‡ation persis-
tence during the 1980s and 1990s. Since Volcker’s disin‡ation, policymakers
have acted aggressively against deviations in in‡ation from its implicit target
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000, and Taylor, 1998). Phillips curves (1) esti-
mated over the post-Volcker period exhibits stickiness of core in‡ation and only
short-lived e¤ects of supply shocks on headline in‡ation.
5 The relative importance of supply shocks dur-
ing the Great In‡ation
The traditional textbook treatment of the Great In‡ation blames supply shocks
for the run-up of in‡ation during the seventies (Mankiw, 1997). A number of
recent papers, however, advocate a revisionist view of this stag‡ationary period
(Barsky and Kilian, 2001, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000, De Long, 1997,
and Orphanides, 2000). While these papers approach the issue from di¤erent
23perspectives, they share one common feature. In their accounts, supply shocks
played only a minor role in the run-up of in‡ation during this decade. The
main causes were …scal and monetary policies which not only accommodated
supply shocks, but were, on average, expansionary. In this paper, I …nd evidence
supporting the revisionist view. Although supply shocks had permanent e¤ects
on in‡ation, they were not su¢ciently strong to explain most of the observed
increases in in‡ation.
I use the Phillips curve (1) to simulate the path of in‡ation assuming that
the economy was not subject to any supply shocks. Figure 4 demonstrates that
in‡ation was steadily rising even after controlling for the e¤ects of shocks. (See
the line “ex supply shocks.”) Supply shocks accounted for less than 30% of in-
‡ation increases during the two major episodes of in‡ation, 1971:4-1974:3 and
1976:1-1979:2. I also compute the hypothetical in‡ation rate based on the as-
sumption that unemployment was at its natural rate throughout the 1970s, and
conclude that the unemployment variable seems to constitute a more important
cause of rises in in‡ation. Unemployment was often below its natural rate and
the resulting negative output gap had strong in‡ationary e¤ects.13 To be spe-
ci…c, in‡ation rose by 10.5 percentage points during both episodes. In the …rst
episode, shocks contributed only 3.2% to this rise, while the unemployment gap
contributed 5.2%. 2.1% of in‡ation increase is unexplained by the model. In
the second episode, supply shocks contributed 3.3%, unemployment gap 3.6%,
13Policymakers may not have been aware of the negative output gap in real time (Or-
phanides, 2000), however historical accounts of the period document that the policy stance
was expansionary, even after controlling for uncertainty about the natural rate (De Long,
1997, Romer and Romer, 1989).
24and the remainder (3.6%) is unexplained by the model.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The paper revisits traditional wisdom about the persistence of in‡ation shocks.
Their e¤ects are either temporary or permanent, depending on the behavior of
in‡ation expectations. The fall in the persistence of shocks observed in the U.S.
data can be modeled as arising from the higher aggressivity of policymakers for
the period following Volcker’s disin‡ation.
Besides contributing to a re-interpretation of the events of the 1970s, this
paper has another, more current, policy implication. Policymakers often argue
that the most convenient way to further reduce a relatively low rate of in‡ation
is through favorable supply shocks. This idea has been known as the “op-
portunistic approach to disin‡ation,” and has been discussed in the academic
literature by Orphanides and Wilcox (1996). However, the assumption that the
in‡ation rate permanently falls after a favorable (e.g. commodity) shock is not
necessarily satis…ed. As this paper suggests, supply shocks have only had very
short-lived e¤ects on U.S. in‡ation during the current policy regime.
25Appendix A
Derivation of the Phillips curve for average in‡ation (6).
Let !
!"#









Substituting the Phillips curve (1) into equation (16) gives us equation (6):
!$ = # + $(%)!$¡1 + &(%)(’$¡1 ¡ ’¤
$¡1)+(0)*+#,$ + ((%))*+#,$¡1 + -$. (1)
!
!"#
$ = # + /1!$¡1 + /2!$¡2 + """ + /7!$¡7 + 01(’$¡1 ¡ ’¤
$¡1)+02(’$¡2 ¡ ’¤
$¡2)
+""" + 07(’$¡7 ¡ ’¤
$¡7)+10)*+#,$ + 11)*+#,$¡1 + """ + 17)*+#,$¡7
+0"25-$ + """ +0 "25-$¡3.
!
!"#
$ = # + /(%)!$¡1 + 0(%)(’$¡1 ¡ ’¤
$¡1)+10)*+#,$ + 1(%))*+#,$¡1 + 2$" (6)
The coe¢cients /, 0 and 1 in the Phillips curve (6) are simple functions of
the coe¢cients $, & and (. Shock 2$ is a moving average of the white noise
error, 3$.
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Derivation of the coe¢cient values in equations (7) and (8).
We would like to derive an expression for in‡ation expectation $¡4(!
!"#
$ )’,
which is consistent with the Phillips curve (6). After repeatedly substituting









Taking expectations over time 4 ¡ 4 information set, here restricted to lags
of in‡ation and supply shocks, we obtain:
$¡4(!
!"#
$ )’ = #(( + /
((
4 !$¡4 + """ + /
((
7 !$¡7 + 1
((
4 )*+#,$¡4 + """ + 1
((
7 )*+#,$¡7
= #(( + /
(((%)!$¡4 + 1
(((%))*+#,$¡4" (7a)
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((%))*+#,$¡4 + -$. (7)
27and test whether the coe¢cients in /
((%) and 1
((%) in equation (7) equal
their theoretical counterparts in equation (7a). To obtain the values of #((,
/
(((%) and 1
(((%). it is necessary to express the /
((’s and 1
((’s in terms of #,
$’s and (’s from equation (1). The following equations provide the mapping.
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and checking whether the values of the coe¢cients on supply shocks which
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The coe¢cients on shocks, which occurred before expectations were taken,
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Figure 1a
In-sample fit of the Phillips curve before Volcker’s disinflation (1968:1-1979:4)
Level of inflation Change in inflation
Note: The measure of supply shocks = median gap; inflation is constrained to contain a unit root.
Figure 1b
In-sample fit of the Phillips curve after Volcker’s disinflation (1983:1-2000:3)
Level of inflation Change in inflation
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Figure 2a
Response of inflation to a supply shock before Volcker’s disinflation
Median gap (1968:1-1979:4) Food and energy (1960:1-1979:4)
Figure 2b
Response of inflation to a supply shock after Volcker’s disinflation
Median gap (1983:1-2000:3) Food and energy (1983:1-2000:3)
Note: Response to a unit shock, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5000 repetitions). Table 3a
contains numerical values for Figure 2a. Table 3b contains numerical values for Figure 2b.
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Figure 3
Evolution of persistence over time (rolling regressions; a 15-year window)
Median gap Food and energy
Note: The persistence index is defined as the ratio of the long-run over contemporaneous impact of supply
shock on inflation, t/g0. The dates on the x-axis correspond to the middle of a 15-year regression sample.
Response to a unit shock, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5000 repetitions).




































































































































































































































Estimated Phillips curves (MG 1968:1-1979:4, FE 1960:1-1979:4)
p pt p pt p pt p pt
Supply
Shock
Median Gap Food and Energy
Model I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)





































































































































2 0.881 0.883 0.899 0.900
s.e. 1.106 1.098 1.154 1.150
Note: OLS estimates from equation (1). The sample is shorter for regressions with median gap due to the
limited availability of median inflation data.38
Table 2
Estimated Phillips curves (1983:1-2000:3)
p pt p pt p pt p pt
Supply
Shock
Median Gap Food and Energy
Model I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)





































































































































2 0.850 0.860 0.797 0.796
s.e. 0.589 0.569 0.686 0.687
Note: OLS estimates from equation (1).39
Table 3a
Response of inflation to a supply shock (MG 1968:1 – 1979:4, FE 1960:1 – 1979:4)













0 0.712 0.480 0.910 0.450 0.315 0.596
1 0.128 -0.151 0.371 0.313 0.141 0.490
2 0.106 -0.185 0.381 0.189 0.013 0.372
3 0.102 -0.225 0.404 0.286 0.101 0.478
4 0.509 0.160 0.845 0.255 0.048 0.459
5 0.382 0.061 0.713 0.260 0.110 0.416
6 0.345 0.025 0.686 0.243 0.101 0.392
7 0.363 0.048 0.692 0.259 0.109 0.417
8 0.370 0.059 0.697 0.258 0.099 0.419
9 0.366 0.051 0.696 0.256 0.104 0.411
10 0.365 0.050 0.695 0.252 0.106 0.404
11 0.365 0.051 0.695 0.255 0.108 0.408
12 0.366 0.053 0.695 0.256 0.104 0.412
13 0.365 0.050 0.695 0.255 0.105 0.410
14 0.365 0.050 0.695 0.254 0.106 0.409
Table 3b
Response of inflation to a supply shock (1983:1 – 2000:3)













0 0.835 0.706 0.905 0.899 0.742 1.021
1 0.030 -0.095 0.140 0.114 -0.021 0.240
2 -0.022 -0.158 0.095 0.186 0.039 0.318
3 0.003 -0.137 0.125 0.072 -0.065 0.205
4 0.039 -0.116 0.176 -0.051 -0.229 0.105
5 0.018 -0.095 0.116 0.039 -0.077 0.143
6 0.013 -0.105 0.112 0.092 -0.040 0.204
7 0.016 -0.103 0.117 0.089 -0.025 0.192
8 0.021 -0.100 0.127 0.018 -0.119 0.141
9 0.018 -0.100 0.119 0.037 -0.075 0.138
10 0.017 -0.101 0.120 0.055 -0.072 0.167
11 0.018 -0.101 0.120 0.075 -0.032 0.170
12 0.018 -0.101 0.122 0.044 -0.083 0.154
13 0.018 -0.100 0.121 0.047 -0.064 0.146
14 0.018 -0.100 0.121 0.046 -0.077 0.156
Note: The above are impulse responses, (¶pt+k/¶Shockt)|u=u*, calculated from equation (1). Responses to a
unit shock, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5000 repetitions). Table 3a contains numerical
values for Figure 2a. Table 3b contains numerical values for Figure 2b.40
Table 4
Equations for inflation expectations – Test 1
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Note: OLS estimates from equation (3).41
Table 5a
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Note: OLS estimates from equation (7).42
Table 5b
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Note: OLS estimates from equation (7).43
Table 6
Phillips curves augmented with inflation expectations – Test 2
(Survey of Professional Forecasters, 1983:1-2000:3,
Michigan Survey, 1968:1-1979:4 and 1983:1-2000:3)




















































































2 0.773 Adj. R
2 0.603 0.742
s.e. 0.675 s.e. 1.390 0.530
Note: For the SPF expectations, OLS estimates are from equation (5). For the Michigan expectations, OLS
estimates are from equation (8). The equation with SPF expectations contains four detrended
unemployment terms. The equation with Michigan Survey expectations contains seven detrended
unemployment terms. There are no constants. The equations with Michigan survey expectations are
estimated with moving-average terms to control for the effects of time averaging.